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 Abstract 
Present article is the second part of a series analysing certain 
periods during the transformation of the Hungarian Defence 
Forces (HDF), based on the ideas mentioned above. The parts 
of the study released earlier (Gradus, Conference book of 
GMTK 2015, Kecskemét) presented general survey about the 
different specifications of military HR strategies and showed 
how much of them came true in the given period (2008-2012).  
The series primarily intends to shed light on what conditions 
helped/hindered the implementation of these strategies in 
everyday life, and to what extent has the previous person-
centred HR strategy changed to an organization-oriented one.  
What were the characteristics of Hungary’s military HR 
strategies in 2000, what were the plans and what could be 
realized from them? This second part intends to present the 
specifics of the military HR strategy in the period of forming the 
professional military staff (2003) from a similar point of view.  
The study reflects the author's thesis. 
1 Introduction  
The hectic social, political and economic conditions immediately before and after the 
Hungarian regime change affected the armed forces as well. The defence wallet was continuously 
fighting with downsizings, re-structuring and financial problems, therefore the principles relating to 
HR management were quite often neglected.  
The HDF became isolated and was not able to ‘exert any pressure’ neither in social nor in 
political sense. It lost all of its relationships and former advocacy skills in the civil sphere.  
However, the economic problems and the openness associated with – in many cases ‘outsider’ – 
politicians' attitudes, moreover the civilian control completely lacking expertise made matters 
worse. The military PR was still in its infancy, and by having made some blunders it was not able to 
increase the tattered image of the HDF. 
The internal and external effects were amplified by the fact that the HR management 
organizations were considered to be bureaucratic organizational elements even in the view of the 
troops. By the new era these personnel organizations had lost, had not replaced, or could not 
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provide (in the lack of competence) their earlier role, which was in many cases extended by the 
task of social safety net. 
Despite these facts the administration system of HRM was continuously developing, and in 
2000 the Human Resources Department of MoD started its work.  Forming the new organizational 
element meant the appearance of strategic-level thinking in the military personnel activity. Its result 
was the Act XCV of 2001 on the Legal Status of Professional and Contracted Military Personnel [1] 
with related implementing instructions. The Act was formulated in 2001 and came into force on 
January 1, 2002.  
2  The initiatives of the Hungarian military HR strategy (2000)  
Hungary became the official member of the North Atlantic Alliance on March 12th 1999. The 
NATO created its proposals about the military force development for 2001-2006, and the 
Government accepted the answer for this in the Government’s Decree No. 2183/1999 (VII.23) [2], 
which already contained tasks about the modification of the organization (fusion of MoD and 
General Staff). During the negotiations a basic aim was the consideration of Hungary’s economical 
efficiency and the prevention of headcount growth at the HDF.  
The American CUBIC Work Group (officially CUBIC Application Incorporated) participated in 
the audits of HDF. Among many other things, the work group made recommendations about HR 
management, and suggested to the Government a significant plan (which practically meant the 
complete reshaping of the HDF in three items). This meant the basis for making Parliamentary 
Regulations, according to which the re-structuring of the complete army would have happened in 
three steps. Although all three items would have affected in some way the HR management activity 
of the MoD, the first one of these included such sharp goals and specialized tasks, which would 
have been practically unachievable without a sectorial HR strategy. Therefore, based on the 
Statement - No. 12/1999 HK.6 - of the Minister of the MoD [3], a new work group was established: 
it consisted of a large number of experts, covered a wide spectrum and existed on the level of 
deputy state secretary. This group confirmed the previously published fact that the military HR 
management will not work in case it is separated from the national labor market, and does not 
considerate its operating characteristics, order and temporary trends; respectively that the 
resource approach concerns the personnel of the HFD just as much as any other sector’s 
personnel in Hungary [4].  
The HR strategy of 2000 should have already elaborated a lifelong career model (starting on 
the entry-level and lasting with perspectives even after quitting) which would have been based on 
an objective assessment and career development system. In addition, a sustainable proportion of 
personnel should have been established, and the differences between military career path and civil 
right should have been harmonized, too. The military and civil social welfare system was waiting 
for harmonization, too, and an effective PR activity should have supported the increase and 
retention of soldiers’ prestige [5].  Although the defence wallet was focusing on these principles 
(MoD’s Statement No. 42/2000 (HK. 15.) about the short-term transformation of the personal 
condition system [6]), the MoD could not keep those privileges which had previously enabled the 
social mobilization of military staff. 
 
3 HR strategy of Ministry of Defense based on the professional values (2003-
2013) 
The American CUBIC Work Group recommended to the Government the following tasks and 
schedule in connection with the transformation of HDF before the turn of the millennium: 
2000-2003: organizational restructuring, improvement of working and living conditions, 
development of staff proportions, creating cost-effective management founds, making the 
organization attractive; 
2004-2006: modifying the military training system and improving the quality of life; 
2007-2010: technical modernization. 
SPECIFICATION AND MODIFICATION OF HUNGARIAN MILITARY HR STRATEGIES 2ND PART 
 
  309 
Among the tasks listed above, the organizational and structural changes were practically the 
most visible, taking place permanently at the beginning of the millennium. The officer, warrant 
officer (WO) and noncommissioned officer (NCO staff) hoped that the downsizings (represented as 
reorganization) would end finally, and with the publication of the Act XCV of 2001 on the Legal 
Status of Professional and Contracted Military Personnel [1] – taking effect in 2002 – those 
financial and social problems would be solved which had already reduced the sector’s ability of 
hiring and keeping workforce.  
The professional activities were hindered by the pre-election in 2002, because crucial 
decisions, providing modernization and development, were delayed and after the government 
change their initials were different, too. In practice, soon after the implementing regulations of “Hjt.’ 
[1] came into force, the HDF started to turn into a professional armed force. The reason of changes 
was the new Government’s Strategy Review of 2002-2003, which was based on the huge 
modification of society and of international security policy (11 September 2001) emerging 
meantime [7].   
According to Kolossa’s researches [8], the statements of the Strategic Review showed that: 
[…]’the international security environment did not justify the involvement of society into the 
national defence training, 
the new social values did not support the conscripted military service, 
individual career should be founded and stabilized after the years of studying in civil life; 
therefore the time spent time at the armed forces might be regarded as lost […]’ 
Based on the Hungarian Parliament’s Protocol of the discussion day in October 2000, the 
reigning minister of MoD revived the experience of countries (the USA, Norway, the Netherlands, 
Italy, France, and Spain) that already had volunteer military power at that time. His opinion about 
the opportunities of introducing professional armed forces was the following: […] ‘in case of 
common social will, even with adequate finance it would take 10-15 years. Forming a professional 
armed force based on voluntary service demands a fairly long period. In addition to the time factor 
it is necessary to consider the fact that establishing a military force of this kind has significant 
financial consequences.‘ [9] 
To conduct the Strategic Review, a Defense Review Steering Committee (DRSC) was 
established which comprised several wallets (e.g. Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry for Home Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Prime Minister's Office). The DRSC identified such 
strategic aims as: 
Restoration of authenticity within NATO's organization; 
Modernising HDF during 10 years to become compatible with NATO; 
Creating the voluntary, professional military model; 
Developing the situation, infrastructure and equipment of combat units; 
Increasing the social prestige of HDF; 
Providing the necessary resources for the listed requirements. 
Due to the above listed points and to the military pledges outlined on the Prague NATO 
Summit, in the autumn of 2003 the government regulation was born, in which the force-
development principles were fixed. Based on this, a proposition was submitted to implement a 
long-term defense reform program in March 2004 - No. 14/2004. (III. 24.) Resolution of the 
Parliament in direction of the long-term development of HDF [10]. However, by the end of 2004 it 
turned out that the program became unenforceable again, because the austerity measures of that 
year greatly affected mainly the defense sector. It was quite clear that the military reform, 
announced previously with a big swing, became the ultimate victim of economic restrictions. 
Each military expert knew that the date was early, and neither the society nor the HDF was 
prepared to it. Despite of this it was necessary to introduce the professional army's formation until 
the end of the cycle, since it deliberately intended to win public opinion and to mask the 
professional failure of the military reform. In the autumn of 2004 the act (Act CV. of 2004 on the 
National Defence and the Hungarian Defence Forces) of suspending conscript military service was 
born, and at the same time the amendment of the Constitution allowing this was also represented 
[11].  
The HR strategy developed on the base of sectorial strategy determined the following main 
directions in this period [12]: 
Béla Árpád Angyal 
310 
Creating the unity of HR and organizational philosophy. 
The coordination of organization processes with resource policy, and with ethical principles 
characteristic for the professional armed force. 
The establishment of resource management and development system based on recruitment, 
being in conformity with the operating principles and the interests of the armed forces. 
The construction of cohesion strengthening organizational culture, and being consistent with 
the organization's goals in accordance with its value system. 
The establishment of the strategic level communication system working effectively within -
and outside of the organization, integrating the environmental information into the HR strategy 
system. 
The leadership training for being able to an up-to-date development, meeting social 
expectations; the restructure of internal organizational legislation considering organizational 
interests completely, so that civic-, personality-, and social rights in the organization may prevail to 
their most. 
The establishment of legal and organizational background stability. The creation of HR 
institute system, which provides the achievement of the listed defined directions. 
The operation and management of HR strategy, based on three pillars (HR Planning System, 
HR Management System, HR Development System), was necessary to provide staff and operation 
of the HDF, according to the HDF development strategy adapted by the National Security Strategy 
of Hungary. The main task of the planning system was the resource-oriented, information-based 
decision-making and controlling.  The management’s task was to provide the adequate quantity 
and quality and circumstances of staff in adequate time and place, considering the mutual 
demands of individuals and organizations as well. However, the development wanted to provide 
the individual and group qualifications by covering the complete dimensions of competence-based 
armed force, regarding the specifications of learning organizations, too. Moreover, the 
development also wanted to ensure the attainment of such skills during the service period which 
could have secured the possibility of reconversion on the labour market for those leaving the 
organizations. 
The program of the 2nd ‘Gyurcsány’ Government (2006-2010) was very restrained and short-
spoken about the defense policy. Knowing the exact economic background of Hungary, the 
defense reform – advertised during the government change in 2002 – was probably out of 
question. It turned out again that Hungary’s planned competence developments, previously offered 
towards NATO's, would be far from our international pledges. ‘The military capabilities continuously 
decreased, the planned new qualities are being built up very slowly. Today, the situation is so bad 
that in the absence of the developments the HDF may lose its opportunity of participating in all of 
the federal operations, and can only take part in the low intensity operations.‘ [13] 
The HDF was fighting with problems relating to logistics (e.g. lack of individual equipment 
and clothes) and human service (e.g. contract staff’s accommodation, and the payment of soldiers’ 
allowances). The policy turned away from the HDF, and the NATO obligations rising from our 
membership were questioned even by governmental politicians and by the pro-government press, 
too [14]. These moments fundamentally torpedoed in practice the effective management system 
operation (which determined mainly the functioning HR). 
It is impossible to plan a HR strategy so that the defense planning is virtually untraceable and 
rambling (the heralded reorganization and modernization – primarily meant as cost redundancy - 
had not been completed when the planning of the next one started). Even before the transition to 
professional armed forces the HR organizations have indicated that providing the personnel’s 
allowances and salary development need much more attention than in an army based on 
conscripted service. HR management should have been already rationalized to conserve the 
supply’s level. Unfortunately it was never possible to resolve the permanent conflicts between the 
rates of officers and NCOs, between the existing asymmetry of Budapest and the countryside, 
between the professional and contractual approach, and between the inefficiency of recruitment 
and reconversion. Instead, it was much easier to reduce headcount, or to lock the replenishment 
number. 
The defense management began the organizational restructuring with itself in 2006. By 
August 2006, the headcount was reduced by 23%, calling this first phase ‘modernization’ by the 
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MoD. The number of departments was reduced nearly by 50%, in which the Human Resources 
Department of MoD was also sacrificed. With this step the professional culture was temporarily cut 
off. It has to be mentioned that all the experts, engaging themselves with modern management 
theory and practice, considered this professional culture to be determining in maintaining an 
efficient organizational culture.  
Unfortunately the HRM as a success determining factor never happened to become part of 
the mind-set of leaders working at the highest levels of military and ministry. Although it is 
undeniable that the HRM was part of the strategic planning system, it could not become a strategy 
defining factor, so it could mainly receive only ensuing or supporting tasks. In many cases the 
political leadership trusted the advices of the ministry's communications organization much better 
than the head of professional field, whose suggestions and submissions were based on expertise 
and legal background. The elimination of the Human Resources Deputy State Secretariat in 2006 
showed the decline of the human area at the MoD, thus some of the responsibilities were 
transferred to the Chef de Cabinet. 
Due to the restructurings and redundancies, the national and international senior 
management, the Ph.D., and the long-term foreign language and other courses became ‘the place 
for the personnel’s vegetation’. Schooling was not always designed as part of the career, or as an 
order to obtain the professional competence. In many cases there was not any appropriate 
assignment for the enrolled person at that moment, therefore these people (mainly senior officers 
and generals) were simply put aside by trainings. It was not an unique case when someone 
immediately after the completion of the training (or just a short time after that) retired. 
The personnel policy’s deficiencies can be clearly found in the fact that although the job 
requirements (No. 20/2002 IV.10 Decree of MoD [15] come into force in 2002, the No. 17/2003 
(HK.7) common measures of the Secretary’s of State Administrative of MoD and Chief’s of General 
Staff about organizing and implementing of follow-up trainings and retrainings of professional and 
contracted soldiers [16]) were not always considered. This happened mainly during the planning of 
career path and appointments of leaders’ positions, or filling the posts being in their direct 
responsibility. If the difference was too conspicuous between the required and the existing level of 
competences, then the relevant part of the legislation entering into force was amended several 
times, despite the fact that the regulations and internal controls did not mean unachievable 
requirements for the positions aspirants. (Compulsory participation on the career course was 
pushed out to 2007, in case of foreign language the date was 2015.) 
The development of the MoD’s HR was negatively affected by the vision of the reigning 
Chief’s of General Staff around the middle of the 2000s. It denied the EU principles about life-long 
learning, and contradicted the Government's submission, too. In addition, it made every effort to 
achieve that the NCO and WO vocational education training (VET) would be excluded from the 
scope of the National Training Register. 
4 Conclusions 
The specific organizational and operational mechanisms of institutions and organizations - 
including the Hungarian Defence Forces and MoD, too – do not always allow the full 
implementation of all HR methods which have already been used successfully in the business 
sector. But on the other hand it does not exclude their proper adaptation. 
One of the most striking problems of the HRM system of this period was that the attrition was 
unplannable, just like the replacing of the hectic level competencies of attrition, and the lack of the 
real support of those who got to the labour market [17]. Although the HR strategy existed, the 
decisions affecting overall sector were not taken into consideration in all cases. It does not mean 
that the development of the strategy was inappropriate. It rather indicates that decisions were 
influenced mainly by momentary individual advantages, reflecting a simplistic view. The strategy 
cannot be changed daily, and the major part of the strategical decisions was made on ‘ad hoc’ 
basis. Financing and recruitment did not work effectively; reconversion was pushed into the 
background, the benchmarking activity rested on unreal foundations. The HR strategy became 
discredited by politics and required the re-transformation of the HR policy to achieve real strategic 
HR management.  
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The HR strategy of MoD and HDF went through enormous changes since the political 
transformation. We need to ask what has forced out these decisive changes of its direction? Were 
concepts really so bad or was it the change in international defense politics, in  Hungarian society, 
in our country's security and military strategies, in international and national economy that brought 
the permanent, large-scale modification of military HR strategy? Presumably the personnel politics 
and HR strategies presented in the first and second part of this paper were blooding from several 
wounds, therefore their repeated modifications were necessary. However, there is one thing which 
is true about all the versions and thus questions the long-term survival of the last version: this is 
the political and social harmony and the social consensus about Hungary's military role and its 
defensive and safety strategy in connection with the future of our national defence. 
It seems from the trends of previous HR strategies and their implementation experiences that 
although all of them emphasizes the determining factors of both labour market and HDF, it stands 
out from between the lines that these trends are fading or are being questioned in certain cases 
(mainly when it is about the realization or development of operative decisions).     
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